Separation Agreements and the Modification of Alimony Awards in Ohio: Wolfe v. Wolfe by Swift, David A.
Case Comment
Separation Agreements and the Modification of
Alimony Awards in Ohio:
Wolfe v. Wolfe
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, when an Ohio court granted an alimony award for
support by incorporating a prior separation agreement, the award
was generally not subject to subsequent judicial modification.1 This rule
deprived Ohio courts of jurisdiction to deal with financial inequities
arising after the time of the divorce decree as a result of changed
circumstances.
In Wolfe v. Wolfe2 the Ohio Supreme Court altered the existing
Ohio rule barring modification of alimony payments that are based on
prior agreements, by adopting the rule followed by a majority of states.3
That rule allows modification of alimony awards incorporating separa-
tion agreements, but only to the extent that such awards represent
support payments. In Wofe the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio
trial courts retain jurisdiction to modify alimony awards for support
on a showing of changed circumstances, but that alimony awards
representing property settlements are not subject to modification.
This Case Comment will discuss the law in Ohio prior to the
Wolfe decision and the rationale of the Supreme Court of Ohio for
discarding that prior law in Wolfe.4 In addition, it will discuss some
1. Mozden v. Mozden, 162 Ohio St. 169, 122 N.E.2d 295 (1954); Newman v. Newman,
161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954); Law v. Law, 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560 (1901). For
a discussion of the exceptions to the general rule, see section I1.B. infra.
2. 46 Ohio St 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
3. Only a few states follow the approach of barring modification of alimony awards based
on separation agreements. Seaton v. Seaton, 221 Ark. 778, 255 S.W.2d 954 (1953) (nodifiabil-
ity depends on the formality of the contract); Beebe v. Beebe, 526 P.2d 1348 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974); Rush v. Rush, 82 Nev. 59, 410 P.2d 757 (1966); Stanfield v. Stanfield, 22 Okla. 1574,
98 P. 334 (1908). Two states have construed statutes to bar modification of such awards.
Cheek v. Kelly, 212 Kan. 820, 512 P.2d 355 (1973); Carter v. Carter, 215 Va. 475, 211 S.E.2d
253 (1975). For cases illustrating the majority rule, see for example, Stevens v. Stevens, 233
Md. 279, 196 A.2d 447 (1964); Prime v. Prime, 172 Or. 34, 139 P.2d 550 (1943).
4. This Case Comment will deal only with alimony awards that accompany a decree of
divorce. It will not deal with awards for alimony only. (Both provided for in Oiuo Ray. CODE
ANN. §§ 3105.17-.18 (Page Supp. 1975)). When the award is for alimony only, "[l]he court
necessarily has in view that the marital contract still exists; that the parties are still bound by
all its mutual obligations; that they may become reconciled and the grounds and the desire
for the allowance may be wiped out at any time. A decree in such a case is continually sub-
ject to modification, while in rendering a decree for divorce and alimony the court determines
the ultimate relation of the parties and fixes the amount and the mode of payment of any money
or property allowance to the wife." Gilbert v. Gilbert, 83 Ohio St. 265, 269, 94 N.E. 421, 422
(1911). An award for alimony alone may be modified not only as to future payments, but also
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questions raised by the Wolfe decision: whether ambiguous alimony
awards should be interpreted as property settlements or as payments
for support; the impact of Wolfe on drafting separation agreements
in Ohio; and whether provisions in separation agreements prohibiting
subsequent modification of alimony awards will be given effect by
Ohio courts.
II. PRE- Wolfe LAW IN OHIO
A. The General Rule Barring Modification
Prior to Wolfe, the general rule in Ohio was that an alimony
award incorporating a separation agreement-whether a property divi-
sion or for support-could not be judicially modified after a decree of
divorce. The theoretical basis for the rule was the principle that
contract rights established in a separation agreement should not be
impaired. 5 Because contract rights were considered inviolable, judi-
cial modification of an alimony award incorporating a separation
agreement that would impair such rights was not permitted.
The rule barring modification had its genesis in the 1885 case of
Olney v. Watts.6  In Olney the former husband 7 sought modification
of the alimony award on the ground that his ex-wife had remarried
and therefore had ample means of support. The trial court sustained
the wife's demurrer, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and
held that the husband had stated a good cause of action. The court
noted that the decree awarding alimony had not incorporated a separa-
tion agreement:
If the decree, as to the amount of alimony to be paid the defendant,
was the result of an agreement of the parties, and simply confirmed by
the court, and that appeared by the direct averments of the petition, we
would not say that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer. But this
nowhere appears by direct averment.8
Although this language in Olney was dictum, the Supreme Court
retrospectively as to past-due payments. Pace v. Pace, 41 Ohio App. )30, 180 N.E. 81 (1931),
afl'd, 125 Ohio St. 53, 180 N.E. 547 (1932). This Case Comment will also not treat alimony
pendente lite. (Authorized by OHIo R. Civ. P. 75(N)).
5. See Note, Modifiability of Alimony and Support Decrees in Ohio, 36 U. CIN. L. Rv.
487, 489 n.13 (1967); 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 694, 695 (1959). See also Tulli,. v. Tullis, 138 Ohio St.
187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941) (concerning modification of child support provisions of a separation
agreement incorporated into the decree).
6. 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885).
7. Under Ohio law, the court may grant alimony to either party. OHIO RLV, CoDa ANN.
§§ 3105.17-.18 (Page Supp. 1976) ("Either party to the marriage may file a complaint for di-
vorce or for alimony . . . ."). But in the majority of cases, and in all the cases cited in this
Case Comment, the wife is the party to whom the alimony is awarded. For purposes of hypo-
thetical discussions in this Case Comment, it will be assumed that the court has granted the
alimony award to the wife.
8. 43 Ohio St. at 507, 3 N.E. at 355.
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of Ohio subsequently adopted it in Law v. Law.9 In Law the trial
court granted a reduction in alimony payments because of circum-
stances arising after the entry of the divorce and alimony decree. The
Ohio Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Olney on the ground
that in Law, unlike Olney, the terms of the alimony decree had been
agreed to by the parties in a prior separation agreement. The Supreme
Court held that in such a case the terms of alimony were not subject
to modification by the trial court upon the petition of one party.
In Newman v. Newmanl0 the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its
decision in Law holding that alimony decrees incorporating prior
written separation agreements were not subject to modification. This
rule was extended in Mozden v. Mozden" to bar modification of
alimony decrees based on oral agreements of the parties.
Although the rule barring modification was based on the notion
of the inviolability of contractual rights, the Ohio Supreme Court
did not consistently treat separation agreements incorporated into
divorce decrees as inviolable contracts. In Holloway- v. Holloway,1
2
for example, the court held that, for the purposes of contempt pro-
ceedings, a separation agreement was superseded by a decree of
divorce and alimony. At that time, it was well settled in Ohio that
failure to comply with the decree awarding alimony was punishable
by contempt,13 but contempt proceedings could not be based merely
upon a contract or separation agreement providing for support pay-
ments.14 In Holloway, however, the separation agreement was incor-
porated into the divorce and alimony decree. The court held that the
alimony award could be enforced by contempt proceedings because
the separation agreement had been superseded by the decree when
it was incorporated into the decree.
Tullis v. Tullis'5 also illustrates the inconsistent approach taken
by the Ohio Supreme Court toward separation agreements in-
corporated into divorce decrees. In Tullis the parties had entered into
a separation agregment which provided for child support payments.
The supreme court held that the provisions of the decree, which in-
corporated the separation agreement, could be modified to permit an
increase in child support payments, but that the payments could not
be reduced. To allow a reduction in payments, the court stated, would
impair the obligations established by the contract of separation. If a
reduction in child support payments would impair contract rights, one
9. 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560 (1901).
10. 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954).
11. 162 Ohio St. 169, 122 N.E.2d 295 (1954).
12. 130 Ohio St. 214, 198 N.E. 579 (1935).
13. Eg., State ex rel. Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566, 64 N.E. 567 (1902).
14. E !g., Ackerson v. Ackerson, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 684 (CL App. 1937).
15. 138 Ohio St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941).
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might question why an increase in payments would not also impair
those rights. 16  The refusal to decrease child support payments, how-
ever, was justified on the basis of a public policy of protecting chil-
dren.' 7  Nevertheless, Tullis demonstrates that the court has not
always treated contract rights as inviolable.
These inconsistencies notwithstanding, the rule barring modifi-
cation of alimony awards incorporating separatiDn agreements was
generally premised on the notion that contractual rights could not be
violated, and thus it applied to both support payments and property
settlements. For the purpose of the rule's applicability, the charac-
terization of the alimony award was irrelevant, since contractual sup-
port rights logically were on a par with contractual rights in a property
division. The fact that parties did not always distinguish between
support payments and property settlements 8 thus presented no prob-
lem, since the rule was uniformly applied to both types of alimony
awards.
B. Pre-Wolfe Exceptions to the General Rule
Because of the hardship sometimes occasioned by the rule bar-
ring modification, three exceptions to it arose prior to Wolfe. One such
exception was established by the case of Hunt v. Hunt.19 In 1954 a
divorce decree and support award, which incorporated an agreement
of the parties, was granted to Mrs. Hunt. In 1956 Mrs. Hunt remar-
ried, and Mr. Hunt thereafter successfully moved for modification of
the support payments because of this change in circumstance. The
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's cancellation of all further
alimony payments, stating that its decision was based on public policy:
[I]t is contrary to good public policy to require a divorced wife's former
husband to continue to make alimony payments to her after her subse-
quent marriage to another man capable of supporting her[;] . . . such
marriage constitutes an election on her part to be supported by her
new husband and an abandonment of the provision for permanent ali-
16. If the separation agreement in Tullis is viewed as a third party beneficiary contract,
it is clear that the Tullis rule does not impair the contract rights of the third party beneficiary,
the child. The child's payments should not be reduced without the child's consent; however, the
child's consent to an increase in payments could be presumed. See Note, Modliabillitv of
Alimony and Support Decrees in Ohio, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 487, 491 (1967). Nevertheless,
permitting child support payments to be increased enlarges the obligation of the child's father
under the separation agreement, and thus impairs his contract rights.
17. The rationale of the Tullis decision was severely criticized. See Note, Power of Court
to Modify Decree for Support Which Incorporates Agreement of Parties. 8 Ohio ST. LJ. Ill
(1942); Note, Modifiability of Alimony and Support Decrees in Ohio, 36 U. CIN. L. Riv. 487
(1967). The Ohio Supreme Court specifically overruled Tullis in Peters v. Peters, 14 Ohio St.
2d 268, 237 N.E.2d 902 (1968), and held that trial courts have contiruing jurisdiction to either
increase or decrease child support payments.
18. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 421, 350 N.E.?d 413, 427: "[Clourts and
parties have frequently failed to delineate whether the award was for sustenance or constituted
a property division for the reason such delineation was not considered important."
19. 169 Ohio St. 276, 159 N.E.2d 430 (1959).
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mony from her divorced husband, and reservation of jurisdiction is
implied so that the equitable power of the court may be invoked to
modify its order accordingly.2
A subsequent case, Dailey v. Dailey ,21 however, made clear that
the remarriage exception did not apply when the alimony award
represented a property division. Thus, under the Hunt exception,
the characterization of the award as a support payment was crucial.
Remarriage by the ex-wife permitted modification only of a support
award based on a separation agreement, but not an award that repre-
sented a property division.
The second exception to the general rule barring modification of
alimony awards based upon agreements of the parties permitted modi-
fication when the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction in the
divorce and alimony decree. When jurisdiction was expressly re-
served-for example, by the use of language in either the divorce decree
or in the separation agreement such as "until the further order of the
court"-the alimony award could be modified in a future proceeding
before that court.22 The third exception, noted by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Law, permitted an alimony award to be set aside under what
is now rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure 3 for mistake,
misrepresentation, or fraud, even if the award was based upon an
agreement of the parties.24
Thus, prior to Wolfe, an Ohio court had jurisdiction to modify an
alimony award based on a separation agreement in only a few cir-
cumstances. The Wolfe court changed this situation by expanding the
possibilities for obtaining modification of support awards.
III. WOLFE V. WOLFE
A. The Facts
In Wolfe the husband and wife executed a separation agreement
pursuant to which Mrs. Wolfe would receive $35,000 per year "for her
support and maintenance." These payments were to cease when Mrs.
Wolfe remarried or died. The separation agreement also provided that
Mrs. Wolfe would receive the sum of $350,000 "as a division of prop-
erty." On January 2, 1968, a decree of divorce was awarded to Mrs.
20. Id. at 288-89, 159 N.E.2d at 439.
21. 171 Ohio St. 133, 167 N.E.2d 906 (1960).
22. Folz v. Folz, 42 Ohio App. 135, 181 N.E. 658 (1932); see Williams v. Williams. 112
Ohio App. 412, 176 N.E.2d 288 (1959).
23. Previously OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2325.01 (Page Supp. 1976).
24. It is not clear whether the exception for express reservation of jurisdiction, or the
rule 60(B) exception, would permit modification of a property settlement award as well as a sup-
port award. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that at least as to the rule 60(8) excep-
tion, modification of a property settlement award would be permitted.
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Wolfe. Like many divorce decrees, it incorporated by reference the
terms of the separation agreement.
Mr. Wolfe -paid the property settlement of $350,000 and, until
December 1973, made all required monthly support payments. On
December 18, 1973, however, he presented a motion to the Franklin
County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations, re-
questing that he be relieved of making further support payments.
The basis for this motion was his former wife's post-divorce unchastity.
It appeared that after the divorce Mrs. Wolfe had become involved
in an intimate relationship with a man whom she allowed to live at
her home. The man apparently made no contributions toward ex-
penses while he resided with Mrs. Wolfe. Mrs. Wolfe, in addition to
paying all living expenses, bought him clothing, paid his travel ex-
penses, and loaned money to him.
The trial court found that no common-law marriage existed be-
tween Mrs. Wolfe and the man; thus the support payments could not
be terminated on the ground that Mrs. Wolfe had "remarried" within
the meaning of the separation agreement. Nevertheless, the trial
court entered an order relieving Mr. Wolfe of all further support pay-
ments. Its decision rested upon its finding that Mrs. Wolfe was "in
fact, attempting to enjoy all the benefits of marriage by cohabiting
with another man and yet not entering into an actual marriage in order
to avoid the loss of alimony. 26 In conformity with prior Ohio law, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court, stating that since there had
been "no reservation of jurisdiction in the trial court, 27 the general
rule prohibiting modification of an alimony award based on a separa-
tion agreement applied.
B. The Decision
The Supreme Court of Ohio confronted two basic questions in
Wolfe. First, did the trial court have jurisdiction to modify a support
decree incorporating a separation agreement? Second, if the trial
court had such jurisdiction, did the court, considering the change in
circumstances presented by the facts in Wolfe, abuse its discretion in
terminating the support payments? The supreme court held that the
trial court did have jurisdiction to modify the support award, and that
it did not abuse its discretion in terminating the alimony payments.
1. Jurisdiction to Modify the Alimony Award
The principal significance of the Wolfe decision lies in the supreme
court's holding on the jurisdictional issue:
25. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 400-01, 350 N.E.2d at 415.
26. Id. at 401, 350 N.E.2d at 416.
27. Id.
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[W]here an alimony award is for support only, is for an indefinite amount,
and where there is no property settlement, or if there is such a settle-
ment, the support award is independent thereof, the jurisdiction of the
court to modify will be implied in the decree irrespective [of the fact]
that such support order is based upon an agreement of the parties.
28
The court used a merger rationale to justify this holding, stating that a
separation agreement "loses its nature as a contract the moment it is
adopted by the court and merged into the decree by incorporation."2"
According to the court, the merger rationale "is not only more legally
and intellectually defensible than any other suggested, but, also, has
been the view adopted previously by this court."3 ° The "view adopted
previously by this court" was said to be that of the Holloway case,31
in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that for purposes of contempt
proceedings a separation agreement merges into the decree upon its
incorporation.
Other rationales for sustaining jurisdiction to modify the support
award were available. For example, some courts have used the theory
that the incorporated agreement is not binding on the court but is
merely "advisory" to it, and therefore that the agreement does not
affect the power of the court to modify the decree.32 Other courts have
simply relied on public policy in deciding that the separation agree-
ment is superseded by the decre .33 It is not clear whether the Ohio
Supreme Court's choice of the merger rationale over the other two
rationales will have any practical effect on future case law. All the
rationales provide courts with jurisdiction to modify alimony awards
that incorporate separation agreements. The choice of rationale,
however, may be important for the purpose of determining what effect,
if any, to give a provision in a separation agreement specifically pro-
hibiting future modification of the alimony award.34
Use of the merger rationale does show that Wolfe is not simply
28. Id. at 419, 350 N.E.2d at 426. There is reason to believe that the court's holding
in Wolfe also applies to dissolution proceedings, in which support awards are based on separa-
tion agreements, since "[a] decree of dissolution of marriage has the same effect upon the prop-
erty rights of the parties including rights of dower and inheritance as a decree of divorce."
Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.65 (Page Supp. 1976). Wolfe's applicability may be questioned,
however, because of the following provision in the dissolution statutes: "The court has full
power to enforce its decree, and retains jurisdiction to modify all matters of custody, child
support, and visitation." This provision may be interpreted as an expression of legislative in-
tent that support awards granted in dissolution proceedings not be subject to modification,
under the doctrine of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
29. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 417, 350 N.E.2d at 425.
30. Id.
31. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
32. Eg., Collister v. Collister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953).
33. Eg., Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940).
34. See section IV.C. infra.
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an xtension of the Hunt case.35  Hunt used a public policy rationale
to permit modification of an alimony award incorporating a separation
agreement on the basis of the wife's remarriage. Although Wolfe
involved conduct bordering on common-law marriage, the decision in
Wolfe allowing modification of the support award was not based upon
possible policy considerations arising from that circumstance.3 6 Para-
graph 4 of the case syllabus states that "[a] separation agreement of
the parties loses its nature as a contract the moment it is adopted by
the court and incorporated into a decree of divorce,"" indicating that,
under the merger rationale, support awards may be modifiable ir-
respective of what specific facts the parties later allege as the change in
circumstance.
2. Sufficient Changes in Circumstances
Having decided that the support award was subject to modifica-
tion, the Ohio Supreme Court had to decide whether the facts in Wolfe
constituted a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modifica-
tion. Prior to Wolfe, Ohio courts addressed this question in the
context of awards in which the court had expressly reserved jurisdic-
tion. In those cases it was generally held that a motion for modifica-
tion must be based on new facts, not on circumstances which were or
might have been pleaded at the time of the divorceY. If an alimony
award was modified once, it could not be modified again unless there
was another change in circumstances." The change in circumstances
could not be of a temporary nature,40 or of a sort which could have
been anticipated at the time of the divorce.4t  Finally, the change in
circumstances had to be material and not purposely brought about by
the complaining party.
42
As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Wolfe, alimony awards are
frequently modified in situations "where the economic situation of
either or both of the parties drastically changes."4A3  Such a situation
was presented in the Ohio case of Ward v. Ward.44 In Ward the trial
court at the time of the divorce reserved jurisdiction to modify the
alimony award in a future proceeding upon a showing of a change in
35. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
36. Cf Fahrer v. Fahrer, 36 Ohio App. 2d 208, 304 N.E.2d 411 (1973) (termination of sup-
port award permitted where former wife entered into a relationship in another state which
would constitute a common-law marriage in Ohio).
37. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 399, 350 N.E.2d at 415.
38. Eg., Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885).
39. Blank v. Blank, 55 Ohio App. 388, 9 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
40. Stauffer v. Stauffer, 4 Ohio App. 2d 339, 212 N.E.2d 622 (1965).
41. Id.; Conant v. Conant, 16 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 72 (C.P. 1914).
42. Nash v. Nash, 77 Ohio App. 155, 65 N.E.2d 728 (1945).
43. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 419, 350 N.E.2d 413, 426 11976).
44. 104 Ohio App. 105, 140 N.E.2d 906 (1956).
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the financial status of the wife. The subsequent ill health of the wife.
which prevented her from supporting herself, was held to be a sufficient
change in her financial status and an adequate basis for the court to
allow an increase in the support payments.
In Wolfe the unusual basis for the motion to modify the alimony
award was the ex-wife's post-divorce unchastity. Though it is a matter
of disagreement among the states, 45 in some jurisdictions post-divorce
unchastity upon the part of the former wife apparently is per se a
sufficient ground for modification of an alimony award.46  In Wolfe,
however, the Ohio Supreme Court did not consider post-divorce
unchastity in itself a sufficient ground for modifying the support award:
"We are of the view that such unchastity as disclosed in the record
before us does not per se require, by reason of public policy, a full
termination of an alimony award. It is, however, a circumstance that
could and should be considered as to modification or termination." 4
The court quoted a passage from a New Jersey case, Garlinger v.
Garlinger, to indicate what effect the circumstance of post-divorce un-
chastity could have in a modification proceeding.
[Wihere a former wife chooses to cohabit with a paramour, whether in her
abode or his, or otherwise consorts with him, the issue may well arise
whether, in the circumstances, she has further need for the alimony. If
it is shown that the wife is being supported in whole or in part by the
paramour, the former husband may come into court for a determination
of whether the alimony should be terminated or reduced. Similarly, if
the paramour resides in the wife's home without contributing anything
toward the purchase of food or the payment of normal household bills,
then there may be a reasonable inference that the wife's alimony is
being used, at least in part, for the benefit of the paramour, in which
case it could be argued with force that the amount thereof should be
modified accordingly. In short, the inquiry is whether the former wife's
illicit relationship with another man, apart from the misconduct per se,
has produced a change of circumstances sufficient to entitle the former
husband to relief. 4
The supreme court then held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in terminating the support payments.
To the extent that the court focused on the economic situation
of the parties, the rule that post-divorce unchastity is not per se a
ground for terminating support payments is sound since post-divorce
45. See, Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 859 (1949).
46. Eg., Otani v. Otani, 29 Hawaii 866 (1927), Weber v. Weber, 153 Wis. 132. 140 N.W.
1052 (1913).
47. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 420, 350 N.E.2d at 426.
48. Id. at 420-21, 350 N.E.2d at 426-27. Paragraph 3 of the syllabus of Wolfe gihes
further indication of the role that the circumstance of post-divorce unchastity will play in
modification proceedings: "Post-divorce unchastity upon the part of the former wife is not
grounds for automatically terminating the alimony award but may be considered in a subse-
quent modification proceeding insofar as it is relevant to the issues of continued need for such
alimony and the amount." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 399, 350 N.E.2d at 415 (syllabus 3).
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unchastity in and of itself would have no effect on the economic situa-
tion of the former wife. The court's reliance on Garlinger indicates
that, in permitting Mrs. Wolfe's support award to be terminated, the
court was influenced by the fact that Mrs. Wolfe's lover derived some
economic benefits from their relationship. In effect, Mr. Wolfe was
contributing to the support of Mrs. Wolfe's lover. Although the sup-
port award may have been equitable at the time of the divorce,40 the
fact that Mrs. Wolfe had money to spend on her lover may have indi-
cated to that court that the support award was excessive, thereby
justifying modification of Mrs. Wolfe's support award.
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, did not specifically focus on
the excessiveness of the support payments, and it permitted the sup-
port payments to be terminated rather than modified.*" The court
cited no evidence in the record indicating that Mrs. Wolfe's financial
situation had changed subsequent to the divorce to the extent that she
no longer needed any support, or that Mr. Wolfe could no longer af-
ford to pay support. 5  Arguably, then, there was no economic justifi-
cation for terminating the support payments. Thus, it seems that in
terminating the support award, the Ohio Supreme Court may have
been concerned with moral considerations as well as economic con-
siderations.52
To the extent that moral considerations may play a role in decid-
ing whether support awards will be modified, the court's decision not
to adopt a rule permitting modification of a support award upon the
sole ground of post-divorce unchastity" is preferable since it reflects
contemporary society's increasing tolerance of sexual relations outside
49. "We may assume that it [the support award] is fair at the moment of its execution,
and that it continues to be fair at the time of divorce if the parties offer it for inclusion and
merger into the decree." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 418, 350 N.E.2d at 425.
50. The supreme court in Wolfe, however, held that "fi]n light of the total circumstances
appearing in the record it does not clearly appear that such terminatioa constituted an abuse of
discretion. Additionally, the issue of abuse of discretion was not presented in this court or in
the Court of Appeals." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 421, 350 N.E.2d at 427 (emphasis added), One might
infer from these statements that Mrs. Wolfe had failed on appeal to carry the burden of prov-
ing abuse of discretion, and that if the issue had been properly presenied to the supreme court,
the court might only have permitted the support award to be modified rather than terminated,
51. The court may have assumed that Mrs. Wolfe now has another means of support
that her lover will support her. There is no clear indication in Wolfe, however, that the court
made this assumption.
52. Justice Brown's concurring opinion supports this conclusion. Justice Brown based his
opinion on the reasoning of the trial court: " '[I]t would be against public policy for a court to
enforce an alimony order where the wife, who was receiving the alirrony, lived only with an-
other person." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 423, 350 N.E.2d at 428 (Brown, J., concurring),
53. Paragraph 3 of the syllabus states: "Post-divorce unchastity upon the part of the former
wife is not grounds for automatically terminating the alimony award .... ." 46 Ohio St. 2d at
399, 350 N.E.2d at 415 (syllabus 3) (emphasis added). It could be argued that by using the
word "automatically," the court left open the possibility that modification may be allowed in a
future case solely because of the post-divorce unchastity of the former wife. For example. some
courts in other jurisdictions have indicated in dictum that although modification will not gener-
ally be permitted on the sole basis of post-divorce unchastity, modification of the alimony award
will be allowed if the conduct is deemed "flagrant." See, e.g., Christiano v. Christiano. 131
Conn. 589, 41 A.2d 779 (1945); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 281 A.2d 407 (1971),
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marriage. The court's decision that termination may be permitted
when a paramour receives an economic benefit from the ex-husband's
support payments to his ex-wife may reflect a moral judgment that,
while extramarital sexual relations are not sufficiently "immoral" to
justify punishing the ex-wife by cutting off support, an ex-husband
should not be required to "subsidize" those relations by supporting
his ex-wife's paramour.
IV. QUESTIONS UNANSWERED By Wolfe
A. Ambiguous Alimony Awards
Although the distinction between alimony awards for support and
alimony awards representing property divisions was not always im-
portant in the past, after Wolfe the distinction is critical. Wolfe per-
mits modification only of support payments; property settlements are
still not subject to modification5 4 Thus, after Wolfe, attorneys who
draft separation agreements and courts that incorporate these agree-
ments into divorce decrees must clearly indicate the character of the
alimony award.
The rule enunciated by the Ohio Supreme Court in t'olfe per-
mitting modification of alimony awards for support even if the award
incorporated a separation agreement will not apply retroactively. 55
The court stated that "immeasurable difficulties will arise in attempting
to judicially determine the character of the award in a given case."56
The court's decision to apply Wolfe prospectively only was made with
the unspoken assumption that attorneys and courts will in the future
clearly delineate whether alimony awards represent property settle-
ments or payments for support. But even if the court's assumption
proves to be largely correct, it is unlikely that the problem presented
by ambiguous alimony awards will entirely disappear. The question
then may arise as to how Ohio courts should-deal with future alimony
awards that do not clearly indicate the character of the mandated
payments.
1. Alimony Awards for Definite Amounts of Money
In summarizing its holding in Wolfe, the supreme court stated
that "where an alimony award is for support only, [and] is for an in-
definite amount,"57 it is subject to modification. This conjunctive
54. Paragraph I of the syllabus in 1I'olfe states: "An alimony award which constitutes a
division of the marital assets and liabilities is not subject to modification under the continu-
ing jurisdiction of the court." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 399. 350 N.E.2d at 414 (%llabus 1).
55. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 421-22, 350 N.E.2d at 427.
56. Id. at 421, 350 N.E.2d at 427.
57. Id. at 419, 350 N.E.2d at 426 (emphasis added). At one point in the opinion, how-
ever, the court questioned the practice of granting alimony awards for an indefinite amount.
stating- "Certainly there is no legislative contemplation or authorization that an ex-husband be
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language, by negative implication, seems to preclude modification
whenever the alimony payments are for a definite amount of money,
i.e., in gross.58 The inference could be drawn that the court believes
alimony awards for definite amounts of money represent property set-
tlements and are thus nonmodifiable. The court's summary could also
be read more broadly to preclude modification of alimony in gross
payments even when the intent of the parties is clear, from parol
evidence or the separation agreement itself, that the payments are to
be for support.
One might, however, question the validity of precluding modifica-
tion of an alimony award for a definite amount of money in cases in
which the parties clearly intended the payments to be for the ex-wife's
support. For example, it is possible that a former husband could
desire to rid himself of the continuing obligation to his former wife
as soon as possible, and that a specific dollar amount could actuarially
be determined as adequate to support the former wife for the remainder
of her life. The former husband might pay this specific amount in
one lump sum, or in installments over a definite period of time.
Such an alimony award is functionally no different from a support
award for an indefinite amount of money. In both situations, the
parties intended the funds to be used for the wife's support. In both
situations, financial inequities may arise after the time of the divorce
as a result of changed circumstances, making the support award un-
fairly high or low. It would seem logical that trial courts should have
continuing jurisdiction to deal with such inequities in either situation.
Thus, despite the literal language in Wolfe, the Ohio Supreme
Court should allow modification of an alimony award for a definite
amount, so long as it can be shown that the parties clearly intended
the payments as support. A number of states allow modification in
such situations,59 and at least one Ohio appellate court has recently
decided that alimony awards for definite amounts of money are not
necessarily property settlements. In Jones v. Jones60 the ex-wife
remarried after the divorce, and her former husband sought to have the
alimony payments terminated on the authority of the remarriage ex-
ordered to pay periodically a sum determined by what he can afford, fcr an indefinite period of
time." Id., at 411, 350 N.E.2d at 421.
58. Payments in gross are those made in one lump sum, or in installments over a def.
inite period of time. An implication that alimony payments for definite amounts of money are
not subject to modification because they represent property settlements is not consistent with
some early Ohio cases that allowed modification of alimony awards for definite amounts of
money. See, e.g., Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885): Sager v. Sager, 5 Ohio
App. 489 (1916); Baker v. Baker, 4 Ohio App. 170 (1915). None of these cases, however, in.
volved modification of an alimony award based upon a separation agreement,
59. E-g., Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 177 P.2d 265 (1947): Barraclough v. Bar-
raclough, 100 Utah 196, i1 P.2d 792 (1941); Fleckenstein v. Fleckenstein. 59 Wash. 2d 131,
366 P.2d 688 (1961).
60. No. 76AP-456 (Franklin County Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1976).
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ception to nonmodifiability established in Hunt. The alimony award
was for payments of alimony in gross; the wife was to receive the sum
of $48,800 payable in monthly installments of $400 each month for a
period of 122 months. The issue in Jones was whether those payments
constituted a property settlement or payments for support. The court
found that "it makes no difference whether the alimony payments are
to be made indefinitely or are to be made for a specified period of
time, so long as the purpose of the payments are for the sustenance of
the plaintiff so long as they are to be made."61 The court further said
that parol evidence is admissible to determine the intent of the parties.
The result in Jones is significant because Jones was rendered after
the supreme court had implied in Wolfe that alimony awards for a
definite amount of money should be treated as property settlements
and thus are not subject to modification. Although modification
in Jones was sought under the authority of Hunt, the court was aware
of the Wolfe decision because the court cited Wolfe in its opinion.62
On the other hand, a presumption that alimony awards for definite
amounts of money represent property settlements seems to te valid
when, even after parol evidence has been admitted to determine the
parties' intent, the character of the award is still ambiguous. Since
awards for definite amounts of money and property settlements are
similar on their face-i.e. both are payments of fixed amounts of money-
it would seem reasonable to presume that ambiguous alimony awards
for definite amounts of money are property settlements.
2. Alimony Aiwards for Indefinite Amounts of Money
Alimony awards for indefinite amounts of money are awards
that do not provide for payment in one lump sum or in installments
over a fixed period of time. Instead, the husband must make periodic
payments for an indefinite amount of time, usually until the wife dies
or remarries. An alimony award for an indefinite amount of money
63is not necessarily for support and sustenance. The conjunctive
language used in the Ohio Supreme Court's textual summary in Wolfe
-"where an alimony award is for support only, [and] is for an indefinite
amount"64-indicates that an award for an indefinite amount is not
necessarily synonymous with an award for support.
The supreme court in Wolfe did not directly consider the question
of how Ohio courts should deal with ambiguous alimony awards for in-
61. Id. at 7.
62. Id. at 4-5.
63. For cases in which the alimony award for an indefinite amount was treated as a prop-
erty settlement, see Sullivan v. Sullivan, 215 Ala. 627, 111 So. 911 (1927); Ettlinger %.
Ettlinger, 3 Cal. 2d 172, 44 P.2d 540 (1935); Salomon v. Salomon. 196 So,2d II I (Fla. 1967):
Kimball v. Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 356 P.2d 919 (1960); Richey v. Richey. 389 S.W.2d 914 (Ky.
1965); Campbell v. Campbell, 66 Wash. 2d 177, 401 P.2d 651 (1965).
64. 46 Ohio St.2d at 419, 350 N.E.2d at 426.
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definite amounts of money, presumably because of the court's as-
sumption that attorneys and courts will clearly indicate in the future
whether alimony awards represent property settlements or payments
for support. Nevertheless, the court's attitude toward this problem
can be inferred from the court's discussion of the history and nature
of alimony.
The court in Wolfe noted that the practice of granting alimony
arose from the husband's common-law duty to support his wife. Ali-
mony was theoretically available only when the husband and wife
were separated but still legally married. 65  The Ohio judiciary, how-
ever, consistently granted alimony as an incident to absolute divorce,
66
probably out of a desire to offset the inequitable effects of early property
laws on women. In view of this historical background, the Wolfe court
stated:
[W]e end our quest for an ascertainable and legitimate basis for post-
marital alimony, properly so-called [i.e., support payments], because we
are confident that modem legal principles cannot harbor such an ana-
chronistic notion. Rather it is our considered opinion that most awards
of property incident to a final divorce are readjustments of the party's
property rights .... 67
The court in Wolfe implied that the prime concern at the time of
65. Vernier and Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present
Statutorv Structure, 6 LAW & CONENP. PROB. 197, 198-99 (1939). Divorces were not granted
at English common law. They could be obtained only in the Ecclesiastical courts or by special
act of Parliament. The common practice in the Ecclesiastical courts was to grant a divorce
a mensa et thoro (i.e., a legal separation). The Ecclesiastical courts granted "alimony" (sup-
port) to the wife upon the basis of the husband's common-law duty to support the wife. Such
awards were justifiable in theory because the marriage relationship still existed. But when it
became a common practice in Ohio and elsewhere to grant absolute c ivorces, which terminated
the marriage relationship and the duty of support, courts continued to grant support awards
despite the fact that the theoretical basis for such awards no longer exis'ed.
66. !-g., Piatt v. Piatt, 9 Ohio 37 (1839).
67. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 410-11, 350 N.E.2d at 421. Although the court's discussion of the
history and nature of alimony is not always clear, it seems at times that the court questions the
entire practice of granting alimony awards for support, as its referenc.- to the practice of grant-
ing such awards as an "anachronistic notion" indicates. The court also quoted the following
statement from a Washington case: "When the wife has the ability to earn a living, it is not the
policy of the law of this state to give her a perpetual lien on her divorced husband's future
income." Id. at 419, n.36, 350 N.E.2d at 425-26, n.36, quoting Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wash.
2d 639, 642, 369 P.2d 516, 518 (1962).
In its apparent desire to cast doubt on the validity of support awards, the court seems to
have either misread or ignored the Ohio alimony statute, Onto REv. COD ANN. §§ 3105.18
(Page Supp. 1976). The supreme court stated, "Only after a division cf property is made, is the
court statutorily authorized to consider whether an additional amount is needed for sustenance,
and for what period will such necessity persist." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 414, 350 N.E.2d at 423. There
is no support for this statement in § 3105.18. This statement also conflicts with the language
used by the court in summarizing its holding: "[W]here an alimony award is for support only,
is for an indefinite amount, and where there is no property settlement . . . ." Id. at 419. 350
N.E.2d at 426 (emphasis added). These statements by the Ohio Supreme Court should not be
accepted at face value. They are relevant, however, insofar as they indicate the court's belief
that most alimony awards represent property settlements, and inferentially, that ambiguous ali-
mony awards should be presumed to be property settlements.
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the divorce should be to achieve a just and equitable property settle-
ment.68
The court does not decree alimony as a debt to the wife, or as damages
to be paid to her by her late husband, but as a part of the estate standing
in his name in which she has a right to share, fixed by the court in its
discretion and thus appropriated to her, and to which she thereupon be-
comes legally entitled.
• . . The court must approach the [divorce] proceeding much like a
suit in partition or an action to dissolve, windup and distribute the assets
and liabilities of a partnership.69
If the supreme court believes that a trial court's primary concern
at the time of divorce is to achieve a just and equitable property
settlement,70 one could infer that a trial court would be wise to first
consider the possibility that the alimony award represents a property
settlement when it is confronted with a petition to modify an ambiguous
alimony award for an indefinite amount of money.
It could be argued, nevertheless, that the court's decision to limit
Wolfe to prospective application demonstrates that the court will not
be inclined to view ambiguous alimony awards as property settlements.
Wolfe did not change the prior Ohio law that property settlements are
not subject to subsequent judicial modification. Since many separa-
tion agreements drafted in the past did not distinguish between support
payments and property settlements, a presumption that an ambiguous
agreement represents a property settlement would theoretically result
in the modification of very few separation agreements drafted prior
to Wolfe. Thus, if the court will view ambiguous agreements as prop-
erty settlements, Wolfe could have been applied retroactively with
relatively little disruption of the status of agreements drafted in the
past, as far as modifiability is concerned.
If the court intended that ambiguous awards should be presumed
to be support payments, a much greater opportunity for modifiability
would exist. If Wolfe were applied retroactively under such circum-
stances, Ohio courts could be inundated with petitions seeking modifi-
cation of ambiguous separation agreements. The Ohio Supreme
Court may have decided to apply Wolfe prospectively only because
of the fear of this potentially massive litigation.7'
This argument, however, fails to take into account the fact that
potentially massive litigation could result from retroactive applica-
68. For a proposed method of reaching equitable property settlements, see Foster & Freed.
Marital Property Reform in New York: Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8 FA.tILY L.Q. 169 (1974).
69. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 412-13, 350 N.E.2d at 422.
70. For other statements of the court that suggest this belief, see note 67 supra.
71. See 46 Ohio St. 2d at 421-22, 350 N.E.2d at 427: "[We perceive that immeasurable
difficulties will arise in attempting to judicially determine the character of the award in a
given case. Therefore while we apply the rule here because the separation is clearly mani-
fested, our holding herein is to be applied prospectively only . . .
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tion of Wolfe even if the court is inclined to view ambiguous alimony
awards as property settlements. A large number of suits for modifi-
cation could still be expected from former spouses attempting to show
that the alimony award is not ambiguous and that it is for support. It
may be legitimately inferred that the court applied Wolfe prospectively
to avoid this potential for litigation. Thus, the court's decision to limit
Wolfe to prospective application is not inconsistent with a disposition
to view ambiguous alimony awards as property settlements.
After Wolfe, therefore, the characterization of an alimony award
as a support agreement is crucial to its modifiability, 72 and it should
be clearly designated as such. Since the Ohio Supreme Court is
apparently disposed to view ambiguous alimony awards as property
settlements, however, the impact of Wolfe may not be as great as it
appears to be, at least for future alimony awards that are ambiguous.
When confronted with petitions for modification of alimony awards,
the trial court should keep in mind this attitude of the supreme court,
and not be too quick to characterize an ambiguous award as an award
of support subject to modification.
B. Impact on Drafting of Separation Agreements in Ohio
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wolfe is a message to
attorneys in Ohio who draft separation agreements to clearly indicate
in a separation agreement whether the award of alimony represents a
property settlement or an allowance for sustenance and support. It is
also a message to Ohio's trial judges to be alert for ambiguous alimony
agreements. If the trial court judge feels the character of the alimony
award is not clear from the language of the separation agreement, he
should place his findings about the character of the award in the decree
before incorporating the separation agreement. Alternatively, the
judge should instruct the parties to re-draft the separation agreement
so as to clearly indicate the character of the alimony award.
In the typical property settlement situation all the real and per-
sonal property owned by the husband and wife should be listed in the
separation agreement, and an attempt to achieve an equitable division
should be made. In the more complicated situation where, for ex-
ample, the ex-wife helped put her ex-husband through college, the ex-
wife might be said to have acquired a property interest in her ex-hus-
band's future income.73  This property interest should be clearly
72. But see Mendelson v. Mendelson, 123 Ohio St. 11, 173 N.E. 615 (1930) "which opines
that an unincorporated separation agreement is not extinguished by a divorce decree." Wolfe
v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d at 417 n.31, 350 N.E.2d at 425 n.31. PresImably. if the separation
agreement is not merged into the divorce decree, the trial court would not retain implied
jurisdiction to modify it.
73. Two courts have held that a former husband's potential earning capacity, though
aided and enhanced by his former spouse, is not property subject to division at the time of
divorce. In re Marriage of Graham, 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Stern v. Stern, 66
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indicated in the separation agreement. and the negotiated compensa-
tion for this property interest should be clearly identified. Finally, if
additional payments are intended by the parties to provide for the
support of the former wife, they should also be clearly identified.
By explicitly indicating the underlying character of the alimony
award in a separation agreement, the attorney will enable the parties
to the agreement to control whether modification of the alimony award
is possible in the event of a substantial change in circumstances
subsequent to the divorce without the expense and inconvenience of
litigation to determine the character of the award. Clearly indicating
the character of the alimony award in the separation agreement should
also alleviate to a great extent the danger of malpractice actions by
clients whose intent with respect to modification of alimony awards has
been thwarted by ambiguous drafting.
C. Agreement of the Parties Prohibiting Future Modification
In Wolfe the separation agreement did not contain a provision
prohibiting future modification of the alimony award either generally or
in specific circumstances. Thus, the supreme court did not determine
the effect to be given such a provision. When this issue has been
confronted, however, it has generally been held that such provisions
do not alter the power of the court to modify the decree.74 If the
Wolfe court had employed the rationale that the incorporated separa-
tion agreement is not binding on the court but is merely advisory to it,
or if the court had used a public policy rationale,75 it would have little
difficulty in deciding to give no effect to these provisions. Under the
first rationale, the provision prohibiting future modification is not
binding on the court, and under the latter rationale, the court could
rely on public policy to disregard the provision.
In contrast, the rationale adopted in Wolfe, that the separation
agreement merges into the decree by incorporation, presents some
conceptual difficulties for a court that wishes to give no effect to such a
provision. To disregard such a provision would require the court to
ignore part of the earlier decree. At least one state that gives no effect
to such provisions in separation agreements, however, has adopted the
merger rationale as the basis for permitting modification of support
awards incorporating separation agreements.76 It is likely that Ohio
courts will similarly decide to give no effect to such provisions, be-
NJ. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). These courts, however, did not consider this issue in the context
of a separation agreement which grants the former wife a property interest in the ex-husband's
future income. Further, both courts conceded that in such a situation the ex-husband's poten-
tial earning capacity is a factor to be considered in arriving at an equitable property division.
74. Eg., Simpson v. Superior Court, 87 Ariz. 350, 351 P.2d 179 (1960).
75. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
76. Block v. Block, 281 Ala. 214, 201 So. 2d 51 (1967).
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cause to give effect to them would be to allow the parties to a divorce
and alimony decree to deprive courts, through contractual provisions,
of jurisdiction to modify alimony awards, the same principle rejected
by the court in Wolfe.
An interesting question arises when the parties to the separation
agreement expressly prohibit modification in specific circumstances.
It is generally said that a motion for modification must be based on a
change in circumstances that was not anticipated at the time of the
divorce.77  If the parties explicitly anticipated the change in circum-
stance that forms the basis for a motion to modify the support pay-
ments, logically modification should not be permitted. Although
modification has been permitted despite such a specific provision in
the separation agreement, 78 there has been no consideration of the
anticipation argument. Thus, whether such an argument will be suc-
cessful remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
Under Wolfe v. Wolfe alimony awards for support that incorpo-
rate separation agreements are now subject to modification in Ohio.
Wolfe, however, left unchanged the general rule that property settle-
ments cannot be modified. Ohio courts now have jurisdiction to deal
to a greater extent with financial inequities arising after the incorpora-
tion of the separation agreement into the divorce and alimony decree.
But, as evidenced by the Wolfe case, the change in circumstances
necessary to warrant modification of the alimony award is not limited
strictly to changes in the financial situation of the parties. Although
apparently modification of a support award will not be permitted on
the sole ground of the former spouse's post-divorce unchastity, such
misconduct coupled with the fact that the paramour has derived an
economic benefit from the support payments is a sufficient change in
circumstances to warrant modification.
Wolfe delivers a message to attorneys in Ohio to clearly indicate
in a separation agreement whether the award of alimony represents a
property settlement or an allowance for support. If an attorney
fails to clearly indicate the character of an alimony award in a separa-
tion agreement, the trial judge should resolve this ambiguity before
incorporating the agreement into the divorce decree. Given the fact
that the Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that it may view ambigu-
ous alimony awards as property settlements, failure to resolve any
77. Eg., Conant v. Conant, 16 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 72 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1914).
78. See, e.g., Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N.E.2d 504. cen. denied, 311 U.S. 670
(1940); Mark v. Mark, 248 Minn. 446, 80 N.W.2d 621 (1957).
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ambiguity in the alimony award may result in its nonmodifiability.
Thus, the impact of Wolfe may not be as great as it appears to be, at
least for future alimony awards that are ambiguous.
David A. Swift



